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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts of the Respondent is replete with
inaccuracies and mischaracterizations
record.

as to the facts in the

The City implies, for example, that the original

building permit for the property of Plaintiffs was for a home
only when, at all times, the plan was for a home and dental
office.

(Tr. 13-14.)

The City further implies that the City

Engineer, Mr. Huefner, was not authorized to tell the Plaintiffs
what the setback requirements from Cedar Hills Drive were or to
verify the setback, when the testimony of Mr. Huefner was to the
contrary.

(Tr. 316.)

The City further suggests that Plaintiffs

constructed the new improvements to their home, including the
garage and patient parking lot, without building permits when the
City knows that such building permits, in accordance with the
Federal Court Settlement Agreement, were not necessary.
These,

and

similar

misstatements

are

important,

background information, but certainly not dispositive.

as

However,

the City makes one statement of fact which is not only false but
extremely crucial to a proper understanding of the case at hand.
On

page

five

(5)

of

its

Brief,

the

City

states

in

subparagraph (m) that as a part of the application process for
the construction of the fence, Plaintiffs presented to the City a
map representing their property lines as well as their knowledge
of the eighty foot (80•) Cedar Hills Drive right-of-way.

The

Respondent then states in subparagraph (n) that "in reliance on
1

Plaintiffs1

map,

City

Engineer

Sonntag

prepared

a

drawing

(Exhibit 18) and placed stakes along the west edge of the rightof-way to assist the City Council in getting a rough idea of
Plaintiffs1 proposed fence project."
The statements made in subparagraphs (m) and (n) above are
simply not true.
1.

The record supports only one scenario:

On October

12, 1983, the City Council

specifically

directed the City Engineer to go to the Plaintiff's property and
stake the right-of-way

lines so that the City Council could

understand the proximity of the proposed fence to the right-ofway and to Plaintiff's home and property. (Tr. 117.)
2.

In accordance with those instructions, the City Engineer

visited the property of the Plaintiffs on October 13, 1983 and
located the right-of-way line.

He then calculated the distance

between the right-of-way line and Plaintiff's home to be thirtyone feet (31f).
measurements

no

There is no question that at the time of these
map,

drawing,

sketch

or

illustration

of

Plaintiff's property had been prepared by anyone. (Tr. 117-18.)
3.

Only after the City Engineer had given the information

as to the distance between the right-of-way line and the home,
did Plaintiffs prepare a rough sketch. (Tr. 119)
4.

On the Monday following October 13, 1983, the City

Engineer again went to the property of the Plaintiffs.

He

located the right-of-way line of Cedar Hills Drive and staked the
same so that the distance could be viewed by the City Council.
After the staking was done, and after it was viewed by the entire
2

City

Council, the

City Engineer prepared

a map

showing the

distance between the right-of-way line and Plaintiff's home to be
thirty-one feet (31'). (Tr. 123; Exh. 18)
Any attempt on the part of the City to somehow claim that
it, or its City Engineer, relied upon any information given by
the Plaintiffs as to the location of Cedar Hills Drive is totally
without support in the record.

If this were this the case, the

distance between Plaintiff's home and the right-of-way line would
have been thirty-five feet (35'), for such was the distance which
Plaintiffs believed existed between their home and the right-ofway line, not the thirty-one feet (311) calculated by the City
Engineer.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

PLAINTIFFS HAVE CLEARLY PROVEN
EACH OF THE ELEMENTS OF ESTOPPEL.

The Respondent implies that the elements of estoppel to be
applied in this case are different than as set out by this Court
in the case of Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control
Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979).

However, the elements of

estoppel are simple to understand, easy to apply and have not
changed since recitation of the same by this Court in Celebrity
Club.

Indeed, this Court reaffirmed and restated the elements of

a proper estoppel case in Williams v. Public Service Com'n of
3

Utah, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988)-

In that decision this Court, in

the process of reaffirming Celebrity Club stated:

In so holding [in Celebrity Club] , we set forth three
elements of equitable estoppel:
(1) An admission, statement, or act inconsistent
with the claim afterwards asserted,
(2) Action by the other party on the faith of
such admission, statement, or act, and
(3) Injury to such other party resulting from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate
such admissions, statement, or act. Id.at 53.

The above is a clear, concise and simple statement of the
elements of estoppel.

What should be equally as clear is that

Plaintiffs have proven each of these elements.

The following

analysis illustrates this fact:

ELEMENT NO. 1
An admission, statement, or
act inconsistent with
the claim afterwards asserted.

EVIDENCE
The City, on three separate
occasions, stated to
Plaintiffs that the
right-of-way line of
Cedar Hills Drive was more
than thirty-feet (30f) from
their home. The first
statement occurred when
Plaintiff's home was built.
The second statement occurred
when the City Engineer
measured Plaintiff's property
on October 13, 1983. The
third statement occurred when
the City Engineer placed
stakes on the property of
Plaintiffs and gave Plaintiffs
a map showing the distance
to be thirty-one feet (31').

EVIDENCE

ELEMENT NO, 2

Plaintiffs specifically
relied on the acts of the
City by constructing
improvements on the property
in the form of their home
and, in particular, the
driveway to the new garage
facility.

Action by the other party
on the faith of such admission,
statement or act.

ELEMENT NO. 3

EVIDENCE

Injury to such other party
resulting from allowing the
first party to contradict
or repudiate such admission,
statement, or act.

While the injury to the
Plaintiff is more fully
discussed hereafter, the
injury is self-evident.
Plaintiffs expended
substantial sums of money to
construct their home and to
construct a driveway in
specific reliance upon the
repeated representations of
the City.

As is shown above, each of the elements of estoppel is met
by the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs.

This Court should

not be misled to believe that any of the evidence cited above is
disputed.

Each of the facts which have been stated are, at the

present time, unquestioned by either party.

POINT II

PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUFFERED SUBSTANTIAL AND EGREGIOUS INJURY.

At the core of the Brief of the Respondent is the claim
that Plaintiffs have suffered no real injury as the result of the
5

representations made by the City.

However, this argument is

simply not supported by the facts.
The facts show that the Plaintiffs, as a consequence of the
earlier Settlement Agreement with the City, had been granted
leave to build a large, multiple car garage, which would have
access directly on to Cedar Hills Drive.

However, at the time

the City specifically identified the location of the right-ofway in 1983, the Plaintiffs had not commenced the construction of
the driveways which would be necessary to gain access to these
garages.

The

specifically

fact,

further,

located

the

is

that

right-of-way

only

after

the City

line,

did

Plaintiffs

commence the construction of these driveways.
At

first

blush,

one

would

not

think

that

the

mere

construction of a driveway would constitute a substantial injury
from which an estoppel could spring.

However, the driveways

constructed by Plaintiffs were neither common nor ordinary, but
constituted

a

major

construction

project.

The

driveways

consisted of more than twelve inches (12fl) of concrete reinforced
with metal bars on approximately twelve inch (12") centers.
Plaintiffs believed, based upon the specific representations
of

the

City,

that

the

right-of-way

line

foundation of the garages thirty-one feet

was

out

(311).

from the
They built

these driveways to within one foot (lf) of the right-of-way line.
This means that more than twenty feet (20•) of the driveways, as
constructed, are located within the right-of-way of Cedar Hills
6

Drive.

The approximate width of these driveways is thirty feet

(301).

Therefore, in reliance upon what the City told them, the

Plaintiffs

laid

twelve

inches

(12")

of

reinforced

concrete

covering an area of approximately twenty feet (20') by thirty
feet (30*)• (Exh. 28.)
The injury is made even more substantial by the fact that
the Trial Court awarded the City damages equal to the alleged
cost of removing this very same concrete.

In other words, the

Plaintiffs spent substantial time, money and effort to build
driveways to their garage only to learn that they had been built
within the right-of-way.

Now that the construction is complete

and paid for, unless the Trial Court is reversed, the Plaintiffs
will be required to pay the City to remove those driveways.

All

of this because the City, not the Plaintiffs, made a mistake.
The

words

"substantial"

and

"egregious"

are

not

only

appropriate in the circumstances but are the only words which
will describe the injury and injustice which have been caused to
Plaintiffs.

All of this could have been avoided if the City had

simply done its job properly and carefully.

CONCLUSION

Respondent

spent

substantial

time

arguing

that estoppel

against that government is an extraordinary remedy and one which
is

to

be

imposed

only

in

the most

flagrant circumstances.

Perhaps Plaintiffs would be well advised to agree with that
7

position, for in this case, the most flagrant of circumstances is
present.

Time after time after time, the City assured Plaintiffs

that they had thirty-one feet (311) between their home and what
is a major traffic thoroughfare in Price City.
house

accordingly.

They

constructed

improvements to their property accordingly.

They built their

other

substantial

The Respondent has

presented to this Court no good reason why estoppel should not be
imposed other than to say "because we are the Government."
In this case, the Government has gone too far.
estoppel was overwhelmingly proven

A case of

in the Trial Court.

The

decision of the Trial Court is in error and should be overturned.
DATED This 2_day of May, 1989.
POOLE & SWlTI

IE R. SMITi
Attorneys for Appellants
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